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Emerging Technology &  






GREG McNEAL: Good afternoon.  Good afternoon, and welcome back 
to our third and final panel of this symposium.  This panel is our Emerging 
Technology Panel.   
I’m Greg McNeal.  I’m a professor here at the law school.  I’m also, just 
a little side trivia tidbit, I’m also the co–founder of a technology startup—a 
software company, so this is a topic that’s near and dear to my heart—emerg-
ing technology and the regulation of emerging technology.   
We’ve got a great final panel of experts assembled for you here.  Our 
experts include individuals with a background in autonomous vehicles, 
drones, smart cities, robotics, artificial intelligence, air taxis.  There’s just a 
great ton of knowledge up here, and hopefully we’ll be able to address all of 
those topics in the time that we have.  Can we hit on all of those topics, guys?   
And so, let me introduce each of our panelists from my left.  We’ll just 
go from here—that way—so I don’t have to figure out right to left.   
First is Bill Goodwin—Head of Policy, Regulatory, and Legal at Skyryse.  
He previously served as the Head of Legal and Policy at AirMap, a startup 
that I’m familiar with.  That startup powers the future of low altitude flight.  
Prior to joining AirMap he was an attorney at an international law firm, Mor-
rison & Foerster, and a member of the firm’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Practice Group, where he counseled clients regarding some of the unique 
product liability, licensing, and regulatory risks that arise in the drone context.   
To his right, your left, is Ryan Hagemann, Senior Fellow at the Niskanen 
Center.  Ryan previously served as Senior Director for Policy there.  His re-
search specialties include regulatory governance of emerging technologies, 
robotics and automation, privacy and surveillance, and issues at the intersec-
tion of sociology, economics, and technology.   
To his right is Brooks Rainwater, Senior Executive and Director of the 
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Center for City Solutions at the National League of Cities—one of my favorite 
organizations actually; I really loved the National League of Cities.  I think 
they do great work—if you ever want to get involved in sort of interesting 
matters related to municipal policy, you should check out the stuff that the 
National League of Cities does; they do amazing things throughout the coun-
try.  And so, Brooks works also within the NLC at the Center for City Solu-
tions.  He drives the organization’s research agenda, community engagement 
efforts, and leadership education program to help city leaders create strong 
local economies, safe and vibrant neighborhoods, world-class infrastructure, 
and a sustainable environment.   
And finally is Caleb Watney.  Caleb is a Fellow at R Street Institute, lead-
ing projects on emerging technologies, including autonomous vehicles, artifi-
cial intelligence, drones, and robotics.  In this role he regularly meets with 
policymakers, files regulatory comments, writes op–ed pieces, and manages a 
monthly technology policy working group.  I don’t know if you’re anything 
like me and you’re a law student sitting there.  I would be sitting there being 
like, “those are the jobs I want to do; that sounds really cool.”  But I’m a policy 
geek, so that’s just how I’m going to geek out.  Anyway, so the way the panel 
is going to go is in the exact same order that I introduced them.  So, we’ll start 




BILL GOODWIN: Thanks Greg; I appreciate the opportunity to be here.  
Obviously with such an interesting group of folks, I was a little bit dismayed, 
as a sometime colleague of Greg’s at AirMap, that he was so much more en-




GOODWIN: But that’s okay. 
 




GOODWIN: Former coworkers.  Yeah, so I actually, I’m a—not an aca-
demic obviously—I work in-house as in-house legal at AirMap, in-house legal 
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now in policy at Skyryse.  And for those of you who haven’t had the great 
blessing of being an in-house lawyer, you learn very quickly that your brain 
is effectively automatized, and you learn only to speak in slides.  So, of course 
I have some slides that are very crude that will help guide in my comments.   
And just to make sure that we don’t get lost along in these slides, we also 
have an agenda, which is of course what you need for any good meeting in a 
business context and that’s where we will start.   
So first on the agenda is the introduction, which I’m doing now.  I want 
to make sure we didn’t miss it, but I wanted to provide a quick snapshot of 
what I’ll chat about.  Then do an issue-spotting exercise, which I think will be 
particularly fun, hopefully for the law students in the room, and then talk a 
little bit about the impacts of emerging technology on places specifically.  So 
just to narrow the scope of the emerging tech that I’m interested in, do a quick 
case study on aviation drones, and then come up with a recommendation that 
I have for how emerging technology should be regulated.  And then in the 
remaining ninety seconds, the remainder of the panelists can give their re-
marks.   
So before we get to the issue spotting, just a quick introduction.  The the-
sis that I’d like to advance is that emerging technology, specifically when it 
engages places and influences where we live, or move or find our being, has 
a unique obligation that it imposes on the technology companies.  One that 
they’ve largely abdicated today.   
But as we move from a world where software can largely operate inde-
pendently of the physical environments that are ultimately affected to a world 
where the software innovations move into heavily entrenched, heavily regu-
lated industries like we’ve seen in the transportation space and a variety of 
disruptive technologies, and we’re seeing across a lot of heavy industrialized 
companies across various types of industries, the obligation will shift in a dra-
matic way on those companies to account for the impacts they have on the 
places where they operate.  So, that’s my attempt at a grand overarching the-
sis.   
The issue-spotting exercise I think should be fun.  I’m not going to at-
tempt a video, but for context these two pictures come from a video from a 
major manufacturer—I won’t say exactly who, though it is probably clearly 
indicated there—who has a particular viewpoint on the future of transportation.   
In this particular case, there is a pod that’s being lifted by a drone.  Those 
two things are intended to be independently operable, and it’s picking some-
one up off a golf course, so very quickly this drone—human-sized drone—has 
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been summoned to a golf course to pick up an affluent gentleman.  Can anyone 
spot any immediate issues that this might raise?  Feel free to call them out. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: [Muffled Speech.] 
 
GOODWIN: Golf balls hitting drones.  That’s actually the first time any-
one has called that out specifically, but I’m really glad you did because then I 
don’t have to call it out.  He literally summoned his flying drone to a golf 
course, where people actually drive small objects, that could get sucked into 
rotors, hundreds and hundreds of yards, oftentimes without the courtesy of 
yelling “fore.”  Any other key considerations?  Yeah, in the back. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: [Muffled Speech.] 
 
GOODWIN: I love it.  I love it fast forwarding to the end.  Who does own 
the air space?  We’re no longer operating at ten-thousand feet or thirty-thou-
sand feet, where there are clear federal rules that govern how flying things 
should operate and who manages them.  We are in a golf course, where we’ve 
already determined they are accustomed to a certain amount of airspace man-
agement, typically for small round objects, but airspace management none-
theless, and they probably have a perspective as to whether or not they own 
their airspace.   
We’ll jump ahead to another picture that’ll be useful for the issue spotting 
exercise.  I love this snapshot, so anyone want to call out issues that might 
crop up in this context here that are unique?  And I should say we’re looking 
for issues that are of uniquely state and local concern, and I totally missed this 
in my introductory remarks, but I think what we’re trying to discuss here is 
the relevant level for adjudicating disputes or regulating these types of emerg-
ing technologies.  Sure. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: [Muffled Speech.] 
 
GOODWIN: Noise right there.  Not just the noise of the aircraft to the 
people underneath it, but look at the altitude of that vehicle.  It is sufficiently 
lower than the top of what have to be three-million-dollar penthouse suites.  I 
mean, you know, I’ve just been scrutinizing the New York rental market re-
cently, so those have got to be very expensive places, and I’m pretty sure the 
noise issues are going to be significant once you get down to the level where 
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these people are operating.  Any other issues that folks want to call out? 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Privacy. 
 
GOODWIN: Privacy.  That is a fantastic one.  Again look at the all glass 
walls on those penthouse suites, I’m pretty sure that there isn’t a very efficient 
federal regime to govern condo complaints when someone says they are 
firmly convicted that the guy in his flying car is operating very slowly right 
around, you know, bath time in the evening next to their condo.  That just 
doesn’t sound like something that the FAA is well-equipped to handle when 
it comes to deciding whether or not there’s a privacy concern.  Any other is-
sues that folks can apply? 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: [Muffled Speech.] 
 
GOODWIN: Sure.  Beautiful.  I love it.  That also applies; usually in the 
next image I use that to say where is this thing going to land because all these 
issues come into question. 
And that actually is a perfect transition—once you get down to the 
ground, there’s a world of police powers that exist, there’s a lot of case law 
actually around takeoff and landing, there’s civic ordinances, and then there’s 
a host of other laws that come into play.  Noise ordinances are actually in 
place in every major city in and around the world.  There are regimes for ad-
judicating disputes about all sorts of different issues. 
Just a fun flag I want to throw out there at the end.  Think about how 
boring this guy must be that he’s customized his notifications to make sure 
that the City Planning Department will be able to notify him about a bike path 
that he’s never going to go on because he’s in a flying car.  I just love that; 
you’ve got to imagine that some designer thought that was a great thing to add 
to this video.  
 So I think what I’m trying to get at is that the impacts of a lot of emerging 
technologies that we’re seeing that affect us where we live and where we 
move are necessarily local: the types of impacts that have to be adjudicated at 
a local level, the disputes that are going to arise, the rules that want to prom-
ulgate, the types of ways we want to think about how these technologies 
should impact us.  Another great way of thinking about that besides flying 
cars is a quick snapshot of what life is like when you have bike sharing gone 
horribly wrong.   
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This is one of, I’m sure folks have seen these circulating on the Internet: 
there was a surge in China, in particular, but in a variety of different munici-
palities antedating the scooter craze, where folks realized you can slap a GPS 
device that had connectivity on a bicycle and all of a sudden you could share 
bikes everywhere.   
The markets were massively saturated, cities across China were signifi-
cantly disrupted even though they already were accustomed to having lots of 
bicycle traffic and you had somewhat dystopian scenes like this with civic 
authorities impounding bikes by the tens of thousands and creating, you know, 
these bike monsters, which I think it’s again just intended to give you a vis-
ceral illustration of where this impact is felt—this impact is felt at the city 
level and necessarily so because the nature of the technology.   
This picture is intended to give us a sense of how quickly our city and 
landscape could be impacted by these technologies.  Neuro, a company that I 
love, decided that autonomous cars are way too tricky, they’re going to have 
autonomous delivery robots that will bring you groceries to your door.  Right 
now, they have a single partnership with Kroger that is operational, and I be-
lieve three neighborhoods around Phoenix, might be Tempe, they just raised 
a billion dollars.   
So they are going from impacting three neighborhoods to likely a very 
dramatic impact on cities in and around the United States and possibly around 
the world.  And the scale and the pace at which these devices are going to 
impact places where we live is enormous and the capacity for that change 
hitting communities very quickly is really limited only by the availability of 
capital.   
I’ll skip to the end here to give everybody else a lot of time, but I do love 
this particular image because it illustrates the nature of even less disruptive 
technologies and how you have to recognize who are actually going to be en-
countering them.   
This is a real non-staged image; those are Starship robotics delivery bots.  
So smaller version of the neuro bots that I showed in a previous slide.  What 
I love about this is that these are relatively small, but they’re also just small 
enough to be below knee height on a senior citizen, who clearly does not think 
that they are necessarily adding a lot of value to his life.   
However, these robots are operating at scale at George Mason University 
today—there’s some pilot and they’re serving tens of thousands of people 
fresh piping hot burritos or whatever it is that they put inside those tiny robots, 
so don’t underestimate the pace at which these technologies will start to 
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impact the places where we are, and then try to remember these images when 
you think about the nature of the impacts on folks.   
So we’ll skip largely through the case study in aviation, except to say, if 
you don’t arm communities with the tools and the regulatory responsibility to 
embrace and welcome new technologies you end up in a familiar story.   
Does anyone know what this is a picture of besides Greg? 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: [Muffled Speech.] 
 
GOODWIN: San Francisco, yes.  And what do you think the pings repre-
sent?  There’s a tip-off that its aviation.  They’re heliports.  As we all know, 
when you go to San Francisco the most dominant feature of the skyline is the 
ubiquitous helicopters that fly all over the Bay Area, right?  Everyone remem-
bers that, you know, you’re singing Tony Bennett up there by Nob Hill and 
then there’s a couple dozen helicopters for transit, right?   
No!  There are heliports everywhere and there are no helicopters operat-
ing in San Francisco.  Why?  Because the communities in which those heli-
copters could have operated shut them all down, so the physical infrastructure 
is there, the places to take off and land are there, but the technology—in this 
case a 50, 60, 70-year-old technology, cannot operate—and this is the future 
that we’re much more likely to see if we don’t empower communities to wel-
come technology and address and mitigate the real negative externalities that 
happen, as opposed to advocating for a simplistic federal homogeneity for 
emerging tech.   
And then I think we can probably skip to the end.  But oh, one last great 
number.  Anybody have any ideas what 40,000 and 1.1 could possibly repre-
sent?  This is a totally meaningless number of course to anyone, but if you 
guessed this, I will actually give you a hundred bucks.  Yeah. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: [Muffled Speech.] 
 
GOODWIN: Oh, I love that, no that’s the best example that someone 
came up with.  No, 40,000 on the left-hand side represents the number of 
flights that the National Airspace sees on a daily basis, at least commercial 
aviation; obviously we’re not necessary counting every general aviation 
flight.  That’s 40,000 flights, there are millions of people that are flying around 
on a daily basis.  Huge, huge, it’s a multi multi-billion-dollar industry.   
The 1.1 on the other hand is the Department of Transportation’s estimate 
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of the number of billions of car trips that happen per day.  So you just think 
about the relative scale of those two industries.   
That 1.1 number doesn’t account for instance the number of scooter trips 
or bike trips or the other types of transportation that operate at a radically 
different scale than you see with traditional aviation.  And that happens in a 
framework that is overwhelmingly dictated and governed by local authorities 
for good and for ill.  I don’t want to claim that every local authority has the 
most enlightened response to scooters arriving or Neuro or Starship robotic 
school delivery robots. 
However, I do know that—notwithstanding the challenges of operating in 
a heterodox regulatory environment that is dictated sometimes even down at 
a block-by-block level—cars operate at a scale that massively exceeds what 
you see in aviation, massively, and they do it even though when you’re in that 
plane flying in your unfiltered airspace 30,000 feet up if you look down it 
looks like a horrifying patchwork quilt of private property rights, speed limits, 
curb restrictions, the types of things that are only going to continue to grow 
as cities’ ability to articulate and capture the preferences of the people that 
live there and impose those preferences on the people who are driving and 
operating there.   
Notwithstanding all those facts, the scale of these industries is not com-
mensurate at all, and the scale of growth is not commensurate at all, which is 
why you can see scooter companies and other transportation companies ex-
plode into being and operate at millions and millions of rides within a year of 
being, as a category, as a class.  Whereas it takes decades in order to bring 
innovation, including safety and more efficient operations, into areas that op-
erate within relative homogeneity at the federal level, and I think that’s the 
end of it.   
So the solution that I’ll just leave everyone with is regulatory sandboxes, 
which in some cases are literally sand boxes.  This is a picture of Arizona and 
there are folks in Arizona doing great work trying to create regulatory sand-
boxes to allow emerging technologies to thrive.  So the work that the state 
AG’s Department and Solicitor General’s Office have done in Arizona has 
allowed FinTech, for instance, to experiment with new technologies that oth-
erwise the SEC wouldn’t have allowed to exist.  Similarly, Arizona is a hotbed 
where millions of miles have been driven for autonomous cars, unlike for in-
stance, an industry that is largely governed by federal authority, drones, peo-
ple measure their successes by literally single flights saying we did an indi-
vidual flight that went beyond line of sight and people cheer, whereas 
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companies like Waymo actually talk about going millions of miles autono-
mously, not disengaging.  Again, the scale is not in any way commensurate.   
I think it should suggest to us that the regulatory sandboxing model, a 
federalist model, is one that will help emerging technologies thrive and come 
into being and scale much more, much more effectively and much more effi-




RYAN HAGEMANN: Hello everyone, so sorry to let you down if you’re 
fans of PowerPoint, but I’m not actually giving a PowerPoint presentation.  I 
just figured that since Greg and Bill stood up here I might as well, as well, and 
I’m pretty sure Brooks is going to be up here too, so I don’t want to just be 
with Caleb if he decides to stay seated.  So expectations have been set.   
So thanks Bill, that was actually really great.  I think it sort of tees me up 
for a little bit of what I want to talk about by taking a big step back actually 
and looking at federal regulations as they relate to new emerging technologies.   
Mr. Alford, when he was speaking, really alluded to what I think is one 
of the quintessential problems that we have with regulating some of these new 
technologies at the federal level these days and it’s this idea of the pacing 
problem as it’s often referred to.   
And generally speaking, this is what we talk about when we discuss the 
nature of incremental improvements in the law and the regulatory apparatus 
and the exponential increase and improvement in technologies that we see.  
The gap between those two, that disparity, is the pacing problem.  This idea 
that the law has a very difficult time keeping up with new technologies, pri-
marily because the law is beholden to institutional anchors and forces that new 
technologies are not.   
An entrepreneur working in his or her garage to develop the next killer 
app isn’t actually weighed down by all of the baggage that comes along with, 
you know, trying to change basically any rules currently in the Federal Reg-
ister or trying to pass a new bill in Congress.  And so, the problem that we 
have at the federal level is that we don’t really have any system for how to 
think about regulating some of these really new cutting-edge technologies.   
Artificial intelligence has kind of become a really big talking point in re-
cent years, but it’s almost a buzzword when you talk to members of Congress 
and federal regulators because when we say artificial intelligence, when we 
say machine learning, when we say neural networks, really everyone’s just 
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kind of talking about the highest-level abstraction you can possibly imagine.  
The moment you ask any specific details about how it is we’re actually going 
to do X or Y or do Z the entire façade just starts crumbling down right because 
any rules that are applied very broadly to artificial intelligence, for example, 
could potentially also rope in your average Excel program, just running mac-
ros right.   
So that also, I guess, speaks to one of the many problems at the federal 
level, which is the average age of congressional representatives being some-
where between Mick Jagger and Steven Tyler.  Now there’s not a whole lot 
of good understanding of how technology actually works, and that’s why you 
have a lot of congressional representatives really relying on the buzzwords 
and relying on sort of low information providers for a lot of these issues.   
And that’s why for better or worse you also don’t see a whole lot of fed-
eral legislation that keys into specific means of regulating these technologies.  
Look at any of the bills that have tried to address autonomous vehicles or 
artificial intelligence in the last year, year and a half, over the last two Con-
gresses, and you’ll find very quickly, if you actually read the statutory text, it 
basically doesn’t mean a whole lot.  It’s either we’re going to build the Com-
mission to study this further, or it’s well we’re going to set up a federal advi-
sory committee in the Department of Commerce or the Department of Trans-
portation.   
So, this all leads me to what I really want to focus on, and where most of 
my work focuses, which is this idea of soft law governance mechanisms and 
being in a room of lawyers, I would imagine most of you are familiar with the 
law in general.  So, when I say soft law, what I’m actually referring to is this 
idea of a system or arrangement of substantive expectations that are not di-
rectly enforceable.  So, things like social norms in your mind, you might be 
thinking, are a good kind of comparison here.  But generally, soft law is the 
idea that we can regulate without actually having to pass new rules—pass new 
laws—and that’s problematic for a lot of reasons, but it’s also beneficial for a 
lot of reasons.   
And I’ll give you probably the best example of soft law as I see it, and the 
successes that have emanated from it.  And that’s a document called the frame-
work for global electronic commerce that was passed, well not passed, it was 
promulgated by the Clinton administration back in 1997.  This is basically a 
long-form document that can be boiled down into four or five points: the pri-
vate sector should lead on developing the commercial Internet; governmental 
involvement where necessary should be simple, and predictable, and create an 
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environment that’s generally conducive for commerce; [and] government 
should recognize the unique qualities of the Internet.   
Nothing in this document was substantively enforceable because it basi-
cally just outlined a set of policy expectations that the Clinton administration 
had for all of those agencies that fell underneath its purview.  And that’s why 
when the early commercial Internet appeared, you didn’t see a brand-new fed-
eral agency emerge to regulate, you know, global electronic commerce.  And 
we haven’t really seen a whole lot of movement on formal rules governing the 
internet over the last twenty years or so, except for recently.   
Recently, we’ve seen a lot more talk about heavy-handed privacy regula-
tions, which you’ve already heard a lot about.  We’ve already heard a lot about 
how it is we might, you know, break up some of the big tech companies, which 
we’ve already heard about.  So, over the last twenty to twenty-five years or 
so, we’ve kind of been running this natural experiment with this quasi-soft-
law document that basically outlined how the government was going to be 
treating the Internet, and which was implicitly accepted by each subsequent 
administration, and actually in January of 2017 was officially reaffirmed by 
the Department of Commerce in the waning days of the Obama administra-
tion.   
So, this is sort of what I view personally as the best example of how good 
soft law can work in practice.  You basically hold off really, potentially bad 
regulations, really bad legislative efforts to kind of try to control a technology 
that doesn’t do well in captivity.  And what you get is literally all the good 
and the bad, of course, that has come from the global commercial Internet.   
Now, we are running into this problem, however, where a lot of the new 
technologies that are starting to bubble towards the market that have basically 
emerged as a result of digital—interconnected digital technologies like the 
Internet—are running into kind of a wall when it comes to these processes, 
soft law mechanisms.   
And the problem is that—and I think the best way to kind of frame this 
for people is the way that Peter Thiel framed it back in 2015 in an interview 
with Tyler Cowen of the Mercatus Center; he framed it as—the reason that 
we are seeing stagnation in the world of physical innovation and the reason 
we haven’t seen as much stagnation in the digital world are the regulations.   
So, he framed it as the world of bits versus the world of atoms.  And the 
world of atoms have really sort of reached something of a plateau, where a lot 
of the recent innovations that we’ve been making in things like robotics and 
automation are getting to the point where they can’t kind of operate on the 
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soft law principles anymore, at least as I see it.   
So, we’re kind of getting to a point where some sort of regulatory frame-
work is necessary in order for us to move forward because if we can’t get over 
this hump then we’re going to be running into the very problem that Mr. Al-
ford also identified earlier; this idea of global innovation arbitrage, where in-
novators, entrepreneurs, and the next new cutting edge technologies are not 
going to be developed here like the Internet was.  They’re going to be devel-
oped abroad.   
And you’ve already seen a lot of this in play with things like drone re-
search and development, or even autonomous vehicles, and if you want to talk 
about some really cutting-edge stuff, which is where a lot of my research re-
cently has focused, gene and cell therapy technologies.  We’re seeing a lot of 
really good, depending on your perspective—good; we’re seeing a lot of re-
ally cutting-edge developments come out of places like China and even Mex-
ico, actually, because of the limited regulatory there.   
So, we’ve gotten to a point where soft law isn’t creating the sort of cer-
tainty and isn’t creating the sort of expectations innovators and entrepreneurs 
need to kind of take innovation to the next level in this country.  We’ve also 
hit that wall in the digital economy space, where, you know, we’re finding 
that all of a sudden, the Internet is actually subject to the forces, the push and 
pull of political expectations, social demands.  And you can only maintain this 
unstable equilibrium for so long as you don’t have, you know, rules that are 
actually buttressed by sort of the more hard-law variants that we see in tradi-
tional sectors.   
So, with that I’m going to actually turn it over to Brooks because I want 
to only talk very minimally about this stuff.  I’m really more interested in 
hearing some Q and A’s about these issues and others because I think, you 
know, there’s a lot more that you folks have to ask than I have to really offer 




BROOKS RAINWATER: So, I’m going to buck the trend, and I’m gonna 
stay right here.  It’s great to be with you all today, and Greg, thank you for the 
introduction and that you’re following our work.   
I hope everybody has a chance to check out NLC.org.  The area within 
NLC that I oversee, our Center for City Solutions, is our Research Institute.  
There’s about twenty-five people on our staff, and we’re focused on, you 
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know, researching all of the issues that really impact cities and both looking 
at kind of the national conversation around cities as well as providing guid-
ance and best practices for those cities.   
So what I want to talk about today is the technology regulation in cities 
and really think about my thesis, which is that local regulation and innovation 
coexist and support one another.  And I start with the kind of “small C” con-
servative principle, that the government closest to the people governs best.   
And so if that’s where we really start with the premise, I think that when 
we’re talking about something like mobility and a lot of the new technology 
that’s coming online, whether ride-hailing over the last seven to ten years or 
everything with micro-ability scooters and bikes now, what we really have is 
a question of the “Commons.”  And thinking about, you know, the traditional 
idea of the “Tragedy of the Commons” coined by William Lloyd back in 1833 
that our public streets, sidewalks, and rights-of-way are shared resources.   
So, the question really comes down to how do we share those?  Who 
makes those decisions?  And how can mayors and council members welcome 
innovation in but at the same time have the ability to look at their own local 
context and really make the decision that would work best for their commu-
nity?   
And so, the premise being that there’s been a lot of state-level preemption 
that has come down, and really put the context into place that it was the state 
that should be making the decisions on something that used to be seen as very 
much a local matter, which would be our streets, would be our sidewalks.   
You know, there are definitely good reasons for why different levels of 
government regulate, but I think the reason that we see cities regulating really 
comes down to three core things: health, safety, and welfare.  City govern-
ments have always been charged with protecting the health, safety, and wel-
fare of the public.  And so, while different cities may choose to regulate dif-
ferently, I think we should respect what’s happening in one community and 
really think about why it is that that, you know, local governing body would 
regulate in a certain way.   
There’s always going to be cases that kind of come out of the mainstream, 
whether we’re talking about housing or other issues, where there’s been some 
real challenges and how local governments have regulated.  But ultimately, I 
think particularly as we’re talking about new mobility trends, the kind of push-
pull that we’ve seen actually between local governments and technology com-
panies, I think, has pushed the companies to come up with better products and 
better regulatory standards on the city space as well.   
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You know, as I’ve talked to people over the years, there’s often, you 
know, conversation around cities not being able to kind of react in a quick 
enough manner.  And what I would say is if you look at kind of the history of 
how cities have reacted to these new technology trends, it has actually sped 
up quite significantly in recent years to where we have, you know, larger and 
larger urban marketplaces, which are where these companies really are fo-
cused.   
You know, the kind of distinction I would say is if you look at a company 
like Uber, Lyft, or you know now with Bird, Lime, and others, they are fo-
cused first and foremost on our largest urban centers, whether here in the U.S. 
or globally.  And so, when we look globally, the kind of “mega regions” are 
driving a big portion of our GDP here in the U.S.  Our 250 largest cities are 
kind of putting out 80% of all economic activity.  So, when I think about how, 
you know, this growth is happening, I want to look at some of the challenges 
of growth.   
In thinking about, you know, different things like co-option of public 
spaces, market failures, kind of the blurring of the public and private, and 
really even profits over people.  Because ultimately if you’re a local govern-
ment leader, you want to make sure that companies thrive within your city, 
that is one of the core things, but at the heart of what you do every day is 
you’re trying to react and kind of protect the public welfare.   
And so, when we get into issues like preemption, I really think again, and 
kind of reinforcing this idea, of cities and kind of the leaders there being able 
to govern best because they know their communities and they know what kind 
of commerce can thrive best.  The interplay between kind of federalism and 
preemption is really a kind of critical issue.   
And we’ve seen over recent years, and we’ve done quite a bit of research 
on this; there’s been a real upsurge in preemption.  I think there’s a lot of 
pieces that have played into this.  Politics has become so divergent between 
our largest urban areas and our rural parts of the country, and this has played 
out in how many of these battles have kind of taken shape.  And ultimately, I 
think the more that state governing bodies can work with local governing bod-
ies to make sure that we’re kind of not putting ceilings, but instead floors on 
regulatory kinds of laws, so it still gives you the ability to innovate within 
your own community, the preemption isn’t necessarily a bad thing.   
It’s just how it’s been used in recent years that has really led to some 
challenges.  Because I do believe that layers of regulation make sense.  I think 
that states should be looking at things like safety.  I think that when you’re 
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looking at autonomous vehicles or many other new technologies that cities 
aren’t going to be able to regulate these things on their own nor should they, 
that there’s a clear delineation between city, state, and federal government on 
how you regulate these new technologies.   
But I do think that as we’ve seen many of these preemption battles play 
out in states that special interests have had a little bit more of a say than I think 
they should.  And I go back to kind of this premise that if the largest kind of 
marketplace that companies are focused on are within our urban areas, the 
idea that kind of the rural component of the state is kind of driving that regu-
lation, to me, seems a bit of a challenge.  That’s not to say that everybody 
shouldn’t be involved and have this conversation, but I would kind of always 
kind of go back to the localist approach and put the city first.   
And to that end, it’s interesting that you mentioned Arizona before be-
cause I think that there’s been a lot of really fascinating things happening in 
Arizona, a lot of innovation that’s been driven by governor Ducey and others 
that have thought about how you can welcome these companies in and kind 
of drive technological innovation.   
On the other hand, I think that you also see some challenges and particu-
larly in the autonomous vehicle space having the first death of a pedestrian 
with Uber.  And why I bring that up is because Waymo has been doing amaz-
ing things in the state.  And so, it makes me wonder from kind of the safety 
regulation standpoint, do you have some actors like Waymo that are just doing 
a really good job with their autonomous vehicles in a different way than 
maybe other companies are?   
And what is the state component on how they would regulate that, and 
you know, that gets to the interplay of what we’ve seen in Colorado.  When 
ride-hailing first came online in Colorado, you know, Denver was obviously 
the kind of core marketplace, but there are a lot of other places where Uber 
and Lyft started to operate.  And the state did preempt the localities from hav-
ing ride hailing kind of legislation within their own cities, but it was really a 
two-way conversation.  So the state worked together with Denver and many 
of the other cities to find regulations that work for both the state level, to make 
sure that you had kind of that broad economic marketplace that we’re looking 
for, but it also took into consideration many of those city level issues that they 
were having.  And now you’re seeing further innovation where Uber is work-
ing directly with Denver and the public transportation agency there to really 
think about how it’s a first-mile-last-mile solution both with their vehicles, as 
well as bikes, and other micro mobility companies that they own.   
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And so, I think as you build these relationships between the layers of gov-
ernment you can actually have better outcomes, and so that’s arguably I think 
what everybody wants.  You know, I may have a bias and say that cities are 
where innovation happens, but I do think that all layers of government work-
ing together can create better outcomes.  So, with that I will pass it over to 




McNEAL: Will he stand?  Will he sit? 
 
CALEB WATNEY: See Brooks came up with a novel innovation.  He 
said you could give your speech while still sitting, and since I’m going to take 
advantage of that innovation, there is spillover effects from his innovation that 
I’m gonna benefit from.   
No, but thank you all for having me and thanks to all the other panelists.  
I think there has been a really interesting conversation, and I hope that my 
speech can kind of connect some of the dots in sort of when is federalism 
versus preemption warranted for emerging technologies?  How should we 
think about that?  But I want to start off with the discussion of what I think 
are the two forces sort of shaping competition between different regulatory 
jurisdictions.  How do jurisdictions act when they’re in competition with one 
another?   
And so, the first of these forces is one that’s already been discussed—Mr. 
Alford brought it up—and that’s innovation arbitrage.  And the basic idea is 
that innovation can flow across borders to the jurisdiction where it’s most 
welcome.   
There’s been a lot of really good interesting examples of that recently.  
Obviously, drones have been brought up.  You’re seeing Canada, Australia, 
Switzerland being some of the main places where, you know, drones are being 
tested and deployed before the United States because their regulators have 
been more open.   
Similarly, you saw a couple years ago when the FDA was sending cease 
and desist letters to 23andMe; they moved to the UK in response to that.  And 
this is also a force that can act within a country.   
As has been mentioned several times, Arizona has been the leader in au-
tonomous vehicle deployment and testing partially because Arizona has dif-
ferentiated themselves by having the most welcoming and friendly innovation 
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framework for autonomous vehicles.  And so that basic force of innovation 
arbitrage you could kind of think of it as it like an anti-regulation force push-
ing in one direction, in the sense that innovation is just going to move to the 
jurisdiction where it’s most welcome.   
The other force and the one that pushes in sort of the opposite direction is 
one I haven’t exactly heard a good name for before, so if you guys have input 
afterwards, please let me know.  I’m gonna call it a regulatory heckler’s veto.  
And the weird thing about this is when you have a technology where a large 
portion of its value derives from being heavily networked, has large network 
effects, then any of the sub-jurisdictions within the market who has a suffi-
ciently large market share can kind of veto the current regulatory equilibrium, 
make it higher, and the entire market has to shift to that new equilibrium. 
 




WATNEY: California, that’s a great example. 
 
McNEAL: It’s nice.  You don’t need a term.  It’s all you’ve got to do. 
 
WATNEY: Just California.  And California has played this role in a lot 
of ways.  I mean as you were talking about with the privacy debate earlier.  It 
doesn’t really matter like what, you know, the average Michigan citizen or the 
average Illinois citizen wants.  Suddenly all of their companies and Internet 
services they’re using are being dictated by the California privacy bill be-
cause, you know, obviously these companies want to serve California citizens.  
It’s easy for them to have one product that they take and roll out to an entire 
market, and so they take whatever is the highest one, and then they roll that 
out to the entire marketplace.   
And so this regulatory heckler’s veto, again it kind of pushes in the oppo-
site direction of innovation arbitrage, you could kind of consider it a pro-reg-
ulation force, in the sense that there’s almost always going to be some juris-
diction within a marketplace that has maybe higher than average regulatory 
preferences and then that ends up dictating what the entire equilibrium is.   
And so, I think when you put these two forces in contrast, where does that 
get you?  And when I try to think it through, I think you basically ended up 
[with] an equilibrium where, as the new technology is being initially 
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developed, it can be developed almost anywhere.  Like it’s almost certainly 
going to happen because all you need is one jurisdiction to allow it, the inno-
vation can move there, and it can be developed.  But then as a technology 
grows and matures, it starts to be offered, you know, in a variety of different 
areas; it grows in market share; and, in particular, if it relies on strong network 
effects, then almost anyone can regulate it.   
And that’s kind of the basic equilibrium, and you might see companies 
respond to that in different ways.  I mean obviously if GDPR were ten times 
worse than it is today in being restrictive there comes some tipping point 
where companies just stop offering the product.  But within certain realms 
they’re basically going to, you know, meet whatever the highest regulatory 
standard is and offer it across the market.   
The other way you might see people respond to kind of these two forces 
is through preemption deals.  You almost see similar dynamics in some of the 
trade negotiations.  It might be narrowly within one country’s self-interest to 
have tariffs, but it’s in the overall market’s best interest to not have tariffs if 
it allows easier flow of goods and services.  And so, all the countries basically 
come together, tie their own hands, preempt themselves, and then you allow, 
you know, free flow of goods and services, and everyone ends up better off.   
I think that this framework can also provide some guidance for us as we’re 
thinking about when and how is it appropriate to have preemption or not for 
emerging technologies.   
So, if we’re using the Internet, for example, you’re looking at something 
with incredibly strong network effects, something where, you know, that 
heckler’s veto is always going to be a looming issue.  And it’s also a very 
developed market.  It obviously has global reach, and so you might look for 
stronger preemption on things like privacy. 
Or something like autonomous vehicles, where you know it’s still in the 
early days, but because so much of the value of autonomous vehicles comes 
from its ability to be used across state borders, you might want to think about 
preemption there so that you can make sure you’re not losing out on all these 
huge network effects.   
However, on something like drones, where it seems like most of the use 
cases are local—obviously you’re seeing, you know, wedding photogra-
phers—they don’t gain more benefit from their photography if people all over 
the world are using drones.  Or similarly, if you’re having transportation, you 
know, between a warehouse and a particular house within a city, again that’s 
a very local issue that stays within state borders, and it’s not an issue that 
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really benefits or gets weakened from use of drones in other areas.  So that 
might be an area where we look to push more on sort of the global innovation 
arbitrage point, look maybe to have more federalism.   
But you could imagine a future in which the drone market matures a lot, 
suddenly you are having, you know, cross state supply lines carried by drones.  
And then it would matter a lot more whether or not there was sort of this in-
teroperability where you could use drones cross-state.  So that’s kind of the 
framework that I’ve been using to think about when and how preemption ver-
sus federalism is appropriate, but I would love to get more thoughts from the 




McNEAL: So, what I told the panelists was before I went to Q and A, I 
wanted them to have Q and A for each other.  And I was honest with them.  I 
said that would be a lazy way to make sure I, as the moderator, wouldn’t have 
to come up with a question.   
But I actually came up with one, and so what I was trying to do as I was 
taking notes was to try and have a question qua comment that would pick a 
fight with everyone simultaneously.  And I’m gonna see if I’ve managed to 
do it.  So, I’m just gonna throw it out on the porch and see if the cat licks it 
up.   
And so, we’ve heard some discussion here about the idea of regulating 
the internet, and it’s bits versus bytes versus atoms, right?  So, I like to think 
about it as it’s easy to have a set of like hands-off rules when we’re regulating 
cyberspace, but when we’re regulating meatspace, it’s all of a sudden a dif-
ferent thing because the thing that’s flying isn’t flying through the air meta-
phorically.  It’s flying through the air like a drone, and it can hit you in the 
face, right?  And so that has very different consequences.   
Someone surfing the internet on their cell phone doesn’t have an impact 
on you even if they’re watching videos of drones.  But the drone flying over 
your head very much might have an impact even if it doesn’t hit you.  It’s the 
sound; it’s the noise; it’s the nuisance; the other types of issues that come up.   
And so, I’m reminded of the issues that came up locally; particularly, 
Santa Monica was the hotbed of scooters when scooters started.  And scooters 
raised, I like Brooks’s framework of health, safety, and welfare problems.  
They raised issues in the physical world that Bill described.  I think soft law 
wouldn’t work.  I’m picking fights.  So it’s great we as scooter companies will 
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all agree that we’ll be really good about like where we park our scooters and 
stuff while we throw as many scooters onto the street as possible. 
So failure of soft law impacts people in meatspace, not cyberspace.  So 
that would make an argument in my mind that maybe cities should have some 
role.   
But then you have cities that do absolutely insane things like what we saw 
in the uber examples, where they would do protectionist activities to protect 
the unions, right, the taxi unions.   
Or they might make a set of rules that would limit the number of scooters 
that could be on the roadway, and you knew the number was arbitrary because 
it was 800.  It wasn’t 801; it wasn’t 823; it wasn’t based on any data; and 
you’d go to the public hearing.  You’d say, “Where’d you come up with the 
number?” They say, “We just needed a starting point, and so my intern came 
up with the number.”  It just said 800 sounds pretty good.  Was there any data 
to generate this number?   
And so, it reveals sort of the failures of the cities, but worse than that 
there’s the patchwork of regulations problem where if I’m riding my scooter 
in Santa Monica that has a limit of 800 and then I crossed the border into 
Venice, which there’s no like geofencing of the scooter, there’s no line on the 
road, I’m just all of a sudden in L.A.  And now there are 799 scooters in Ven-
ice.  And there are 1,001, or whatever L.A.’s rule is—how can this possibly 
be regulated across borders?   
All of this just suggests to me, and I’m like as Federalist as they come, 
that each one of these new sets of regulatory regimes is a barrier to innovation.  
It’s a barrier to a market.  And that you should federally preempt the whole 
thing.  Bill’s like, Bill has never heard me say that in my life.   
So why shouldn’t we just preempt the whole thing and have one big fed-
eral regulatory regime?  Not all this soft law garbage; not all these cities are 








McNEAL: I needed to remember what you said. 
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HAGEMANN: So, so is the question for each of us to answer? 
 
McNEAL: I didn’t really have a question. 
 
GOODWIN: Yeah, independent of the pseudo-question, I think it is a 
good opportunity where I will actually object to it something that Caleb said, 
which is that I actually believe that there’s a bit of a slippery slope when we 
start talking about network effects as a good that should be protected in regu-
lation.  
And I’ll give you an example because we’ve talked about scooters a lot 
as a good example.  They’re in a physical space.  Let’s leave aside the digital 
space, where I think the questions get a lot trickier.  But just in the physical 
space, people complain about the fact that laws may change from city to city.  
But I think that that is—and this goes against the thesis of cities as places 
where innovation happens—but I think that is actually inherently what we 
should expect because cities are different places.   
So take yourselves out of Malibu, which is a very nice place, and go with 
me to another very nice place, Lake Como.  And I will tell you that if a bunch 
of scooter companies go to Lake Como—I once went to the world’s greatest 
conference . . . 
 
McNEAL: This is in Italy.  It’s very, very fancy. 
 
GOODWIN: . . . and there are a number of small isolated communities 
around this incredibly beautiful lake and one of the things that’s most toxic is 
that you have people who ride really obnoxiously loud motorbikes, clearly 
never heard of a muffler, and then they try to rumble into these small towns 
and a number of them have attempted to ban motorized vehicles.   
Why?  Because it is essential to the quality of life and what is the eco-
nomic basis of all these towns, namely the tourism, to not allow something 
that in the interest of say the scooter company that’s renting those scooters 
would make a lot of sense.   
It is in the city’s interest and the broader economic community to say, 
“hell no, there’s no scooters,” and I actually think that that is a good that 
should be respected.  But I think we can go one step farther; it doesn’t have to 
be the city that makes a decision, it should be the individuals within the city 
using voluntaristic methods to come to that conclusion and only using the city 
as the regulator of second to last resort as it were when their attempts to 
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address those issues fall short of achieving the goals that they’re trying to ac-
complish.  Kind of rambled that sentence on until the end there, but I found a 
stopping point. 
 
WATNEY: Yeah, so I don’t think my argument would be that there can 
never be a role for, you know, local sound prohibitions like there are time, 
manner, and place restrictions, you know, that we tend to find appropriate.  
You know, we don’t allow you to just blare a siren at night for no reason, and 
that’s, you know, there’s probably good reasons for that.   
I think one good test for kind of, like, how strong are the network effects 
and are they worth protecting is: are you in a situation where, kind of, the 
highest regulatory standard becomes de facto the national standard or, you 
know, the standard within the state?   
And so if you’re finding that there is a lot of differentiation by cities and 
products are being carefully tailored to those cities, and that’s maybe an indi-
cation that the network effects really aren’t that strong.   
Now, on the other hand, you can find that sometimes cities can kind of 
write themselves out if they try to have too strong a regulatory standard.   
You know, so obviously if there’s a city that just said no we’re not going 
to have any roads here because we hate motorized vehicles so much, and they, 
you know, bashed up their own roads and had all highways diverted that 
would eventually end up hurting the city, and I mean if they did that without 
any sort of recourse for another way around for the highway then there would 
be larger, you know, commerce issues going between states.   
But yeah, I guess my point here would be that not all network effects are 
strong and worth protecting, but there are some easy tests you might have for 
determining that. 
 
RAINWATER: I think I’m gonna come back to what you . . . 
 
McNEAL: You’re coming around to my preemption? 
 
RAINWATER: Yeah, yeah because I think you gave a great example of 
what happened in Santa Monica, where the challenge was that you had so 
many scooters on the street that they were crowding sidewalks.  So if you 
were handicapped, you couldn’t get by in your wheelchair, people were trip-
ping over them, they were being thrown kind of everywhere helter-skelter.   
So, like ultimately, yeah, I think it is somewhat arbitrary to put a 700 or 
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800 cap on it.   
But I think there are already communities that are regulating in a good 
way like where I live in Arlington County, right outside of DC, the initial cap 
I think was around a thousand and each scooter had to be driven three times a 
day, I think was the minimum.  And as they could show that those scooters 
were getting three rides a day, they’re going to expand that cap over a period, 
I think it was either six or eight months. 
And so you’re starting to see best practices that are rising in cities and 
communities nationwide that are, what I would argue, is that’s where you’re 
seeing that innovation happen, and that should kind of feed the larger state, 
the larger kind of national conversation around how these things should be 
regulated.   
Will you have challenges with that?  Yes, absolutely, but again I would 
go back to the fact that the companies themselves need these marketplaces in 
the same way that people within these cities need these goods.  I think funda-
mentally, things like scooters and ride-hailing are good.   
I think they’ve created a better marketplace for cities and allow people to 
get around in better ways.  And so it’s not a question of whether they should 
be there or not—it’s a question of how they are there. 
 
McNEAL: Just a little side note of what was most fascinating to me when 
I went to the Santa Monica hearing on scooters.  So before becoming a law 
professor I worked in city government—I worked in a municipal law depart-
ment—and my PhD is in public policy and administration, and so I have this 
background in like city government. 
And I was amazed that the city had a mobility expert and two other staff 
members.  So the mobility expert was testifying, and she had two other staff 
members that worked with her, and so that’s not true of every, some NLC 
cities are pretty small.   
But Santa Monica is not by any means one of the biggest cities in Cali-
fornia, but nevertheless has a mobility expert who was talking about the tech-
nology and knew the technology and knew the capabilities of the technology, 
was talking about Github and data sharing, and the kinds of stuff that you, 
like, you definitely wouldn’t expect a member of Congress to be making ref-
erences to Github and standards for data sharing and data portability, and I 
just thought that that was really fascinating.  Yeah. 
 
RAINWATER: So I mean I’d actually love to ask Caleb a question.  We 
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talked about it a little bit before we started, and it gets at—and I love your 
term too—“the regulatory heckler’s veto.”   
So, my question to you would be: how does that play out versus agglom-
eration effects?   
We, you know, everybody laughed about the example of California, but 
so much of the technology industry is here and it’s in Silicon Valley and it’s 
in San Francisco, and San Francisco is one of the most highly regulated cities 
in the country, if not the world, and so how would you kind of see that playing 
out because people continue to be drawn to San Francisco and Silicon Valley? 
 
WATNEY: Yeah, that’s a great question.  So, if you look at like the liter-
ature on agglomeration effects, they seem to be incredibly robust, and they 
can persevere through all sorts of tampering and bad laws.   
I mean you just look at housing prices in San Francisco right now, and 
the fact that it is still the innovation, you know, capital really of the world, 
[which] is a testament to how strong the agglomeration effects are.   
So I would almost say I would think of agglomeration effects as this ex-
ogenous force, you know, where it just kind of, for almost random reasons, 
particular cities become clusters of talent that has sort of a self-perpetuating 
cycle, and that certainly increases the veto power that, you know, any juris-
diction has.   
So, the fact that California has more veto power, than say Missouri, is 
partially a function of the fact that they have these agglomeration effects.  But 
yeah, I guess that’s how primarily how I view them. 
 
McNEAL: Not seeing anything else from the panel.  I’m now going to 
open it up to questions from the audience; just remember you need a micro-
phone before you ask your question, and so looking around.   
It could be a comment too, as you know, because I led with that example 
of not really asking a question just saying what I wanted to say. Go ahead.  




AUDIENCE MEMBER: I think, I think Tom already indicated exactly 
how to convert a comment into a question. 
 
McNEAL: So what do you think? 
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Caleb, I wanted to address your network effects 
factor.  As I think about it, I think that it doesn’t make any sense.   
That what you’re really talking about is the extent to which any particular 
technology, what it costs that technology to comply with multiple, with you 
know, patchwork of regulations, and I don’t think that maps perfectly onto 
network effects.   
Like, for example, drones and scooters should have no network effects, 
to speak of, but the fact that they can cross jurisdictions means that, you know, 
creates a sort of regulatory problem.   
On the other hand, you know, there’s plenty of technologies that will al-
low you to identify where a user is coming from, and you may have a lot of 
network effects.   
You may have a perfect ability to serve up, you know, to comport with 
certain regulations for users from one jurisdiction, and it really doesn’t cost 
that much more to also comport with regulations from another.  I think that’s 
the thing that mediates.   
It’s not so much—some of that will map on to network effects—but not 
consistently.  I mean, I do think that you’re right about the push-pull between 
the two effects you identified, but I think the third thing is really this this cost 




AUDIENCE MEMBER: . . . and of course that will also depend on the 
type of regulation.  Sometimes that will be, again, like the number of scooters 
regulation, no problem complying simultaneous no spillover effects there; 
whereas, that wouldn’t be the same for other types.   
The only other thing I wanted to add was I don’t understand exactly why 
we care so much about sort of attracting innovation.  I mean, I understand why 
certain jurisdictions do, like they want tax base or something like that, but 
why does it really matter where the technology is developed if it can be de-
ployed everywhere?   
And if you’re a city or state or whatever, and you think there’s some risk 
to the process of developing the technology well, what you do is you sit back 
and say, “well we don’t want it here—you develop it there; all of your pedes-
trians will die eventually, [and] they’ll, you know, get the right technology 
and then we’ll implement it here.” 
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I mean I’m not sure what you get by being the place where the technology 
is implemented.  You want to be able to use it, but it seems like a marginal 
addition to be able to be the place where it’s implemented.   




WATNEY: No, thank you for your comments.  This is still a model I’m 
trying to work through, so I appreciate your feedback.   
I think you’re probably right in the sense that there is a missing variable 
there, I would say it’s not just network effects interacting by itself.  There’s 
like another interaction variable that I’m probably missing, which is the cost 
of differentiating your product across regulatory jurisdiction, so that if you 
were to multiply the network effects times the cost of depreciation that’s prob-
ably closer to what you wanted to get to. 
 
GOODWIN: But also to your question of does it really matter where a 
technology is deployed?   
I think that actually, underneath my comment, which I started to allude to 
there, is that as much as I am a Federalist, it doesn’t mean I have this unshak-
able confidence in the expertise of localities to deal with emerging technolo-
gies, or that their prudence in determining whether or not they should even be 
a guinea pig for a new technology makes any sense at all.   
My background prior to law school was state and local political consult-
ing, in and around the political networks that influence developers, and you 
would be horrified, or perhaps not surprised, at how many cities love to play 
developer including here in California, for a long time with redevelopment 
money, and they declare parts of the city blighted and then pick and choose 
market winners.   
And that kind of activity, I think, illustrates perhaps what you’re getting 
at, which is, there isn’t necessarily a good reason to welcome an emerging 
technology, and I think it’s perfectly rational for some places to say we’re 
going to take a wait-and-see approach.   
Conversely, though I do think that if you are a savvy community, like 
Arizona seems to be, and you think that you can attract a longer term, you 
know for instance industrial presence or, you know, attract more corporate 
headquarters and avoid for instance the second-class citizen of the world sta-
tus that L.A. now has, in terms of corporate headquarters and the attendant 
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effects on your talent pool and tax base etc., that seems well within the prov-
ince of a locality to try to decide, because I think they’re going to be closer to 
the answer to that question even however impaired that decision may be than 
any federal authority again trying to pick winners and losers where the prob-
lem only escalates. 
 
McNEAL: This is where I’ll reveal my true opinion about the federalism 
stuff which is responsive to your question. 
This is where I think the economists who argue at that, you know, each 
new restriction in each jurisdiction is a barrier to commerce and trade, and 
therefore, we should preempt it all and get it get rid of it, get it wrong because 
it rests on the assumption that the system that’s implemented at the federal 
level, or at the state level, is the market efficient optimal outcome.  Whereas 
there’s no guarantee that you’re not going down a regulatory blind alley there. 
And so, if we’re gonna take like a drone delivery example or something, 
if Palo Alto wants one set of rules for drone delivery and Mountain View 
wants another and Berkeley, California wants to just outlaw it completely, 
which is what they’re apt to do in Berkeley, right, then they won’t get their 
deodorant delivered within a couple hours—which they’re not using deodor-
ant anyway—and so they’re all just gonna like continue to be stinky.  And the 
drone will fly over Berkeley, and like the people in Berkeley will be stinky 
until they can’t stand being stinky anymore, and then they’ll change the law, 
and they’ll order some stuff, and we’ll get to a market optimal outcome 
through the competition across those jurisdictions, and it would be regulatory 
competition for the right outcome. 
Whereas I think what the economists do a lot of times looking at this is 
they say well there is some like efficient outcome that I can graph and curve 
and give you some fancy math, which is all letters, and look at the way that 
this should be as the outcome, and then, in the abstract, if federal preemption 
or state preemption would be the right way to do it, but it doesn’t actually 
really work out that way, which is why my preference would be for the patch-
work because I think the patchwork actually leads us to a public law conver-
sation about the correct outcome. 
 
GOODWIN: And I’ll just piggy-back on that just to pile on a bit.  I think 
the allure is very strong both on the freedom maximizing side and economic 
maximization. 
So one of the areas where I was somewhat dismayed is I saw Tyler Cowen 
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last summer published a piece saying that he thought we should federally 
preempt all occupational licensing regimes at the state and local level.  And 
he had literally one line in his post that he said “because I can’t think of any 
good reason why a state or locality should need to have their own independent 
occupational licensing scheme,” and like that was, the sum of the argument, 
which he couched it in freedom terms and others often couched that that plea 
for federal preemption in economic terms—you’re restricting the economic 
liberty of people in those economic goods that would result. 
But the net result is the same that you grow the administrative state and 
you empower a small fiefdom of experts in Washington, D.C. to make all 
these decisions about our lives, where in point of fact, the reason I became a 
strange friend to Brooks over here is that I think cities with all their defects 
and their warts and the limits of somebody who rose up from city government. 
For instance, who was deputized as the assistant city manager for special 
projects and now he’s in charge of drone policy, you know, that isn’t an opti-
mal, from an expert perspective, an optimal way to come up with the right 
policy solutions, but it’s so much more intimately associated with the actual 
people that are going to be affected that you’re much more likely to see mar-
ket-based solutions and voluntary solutions emerge and be the principles that 
are adopted by the city than you’re going to see at the federal level. 
 
McNEAL: Let me just get . . . now I’m fired up.  So let me give another 
example on this.   
So Bill brought up the example of automobiles terrestrial transportation 
versus aviation, which is such a great example because aviation is federal 
preemption.  So, aircraft take off and land only with the permission of the 
federal government with a federal regulatory regime that certifies the aircraft 
down to the stupid fact that there are ash trays in a brand-new airplane that’s 
produced today.   
Why are there ashtrays in a brand-new airplane that’s produced today 
when federal regulations say that you cannot smoke on an airplane and you 
haven’t been able to do it since like the 80s?   
Because some federal bureaucrats somewhere said “well someone might 
smoke and if they do smoke they’re gonna need an ashtray to put it out in, so 
we’re gonna put an ashtray in there,” and that some other bureaucrat said “but 
we’re gonna steal the ashtray shut so people don’t think that they can smoke 
inside the aircraft.”  And this is running it out of a federal agency, right? 
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HAGEMANN: I was literally thinking that exact thing when I was in the 
bathroom on the airplane.  Because I’m a smoker. 
 
McNEAL: I actually, I actually know you did. 
 
HAGEMANN: I was confused. 
 
McNEAL: So now you have these new aircraft drones that are flying, 
right, and you have to figure out where drones are allowed to take off and land 
and where they’re allowed to operate.   
But drones are not airliners operating at 10,000 feet.  Drones take off and 
land from sidewalks and fly next to your face and next to your home, and so 
what happens?  
All the lobbyists in the drone industry get together because all of the cit-
ies, Brooks just creating all these nightmares for the poor drone companies, 
good for you, and so all of a sudden all these cities say, “Well, we don’t want 
you taking off next to my outdoor vineyard or next to my restaurant or flying 
over my school.”  And the whole drone industry goes “Ah!  Patchwork quilt 
of regulations!  How am I ever going to know how to comply with it we need 
a single rule to handle this,” right, and so what do they do?   
They go to the Congress, and in Section 2209 of the 2016 FAA Reauthor-
ization Act they direct the FAA to create a process for creating restrictions 
around places in the United States where drones can and cannot fly near.   
Now in your like normal town, there’s like City Hall does this and says 
like “you can park here, you can’t park there, you can’t like sleep on that 
curb,” and there’s like an entire city apparatus that hands this in the wisdom 
of the industry, and the federal preemption approach there’s one bureaucrat in 
one office at the FAA who’s going to figure this out for the 15,000 rule mak-
ing jurisdictions in the entire United States.   
And guess how much progress has been made on figuring that out to date.  
Zero progress.  Nothing.  They can’t even figure out the shape of the table for 
the room where they’re going to have the meeting to discuss the process by 
which they’re going to figure out the process.   
And so anyway, there’s a reason that we have billions of automobile trips 
on the road today—it’s because we have a federal framework for the automo-
biles and the way they work, but when it comes to Caleb’s point—the time, 
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manner, and place of those operations, where the technology meets 
meatspace, where it’s going to actually impact someone—the time, manner, 
and place decision is left to those people and their elected officials closest to 
the people, which are the local officials, to make the decision about whether 
you want cars parked overnight on the road, or whether you want a drone there 
on the road—it’s the time, manner, and place.  
Go ahead, sorry, I know you were waiting patiently. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: No worries. 
 
McNEAL: I was just fired up.  I told you I was fired up. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You’ve got me fired up. 
 
McNEAL: I’m filibustering for the microphone, really though, that’s all 
I’m doing.  Here it comes. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You gotta, oh she handed it over to me—look 
at this, living dangerously.  Yeah, so you got me fired up because, uh, you 
know if you if you want to go mano-a-mano with horror stories of regulatory 
jurisdiction, let’s go—throwdown. 
Okay, so there are thirty thousand jurisdictions in the United States that 
issue something called a cable TV franchise, that is completely, that’s a ves-
tigial organ.  There’s no reason for it.   
All your health, safety, and welfare justifications are totally handled by 
other rules routinely administered by public works departments, and in fact, 
this is a rent-seeking device that quite regularly comes out of the local juris-
dictions, and in fact they do illegal, unconstitutional things.  And Preferred 
Communications v. City of Los Angeles, is now prevailing federal, Supreme 
Court precedent saying that the city of Los Angeles did violate civil rights 
seven different ways in giving out monopoly cable franchises that can’t be 
done.  This is a very, unfortunately, there were no sanctions, there was no 
injunction, this is a problem—an ongoing problem—it’s, to this day, a prob-
lem in terms of competition at the local level.   
But cities routinely engage in rent-seeking that is not health, safety, and 
welfare.  It’s just rent creation and rent distribution, and it causes great ineffi-
ciencies that can be, in the right circumstance, preempted by federal jurisdic-
tion.   
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And about 15 years ago, California had a question about regulating cellu-
lar—a California jurisdiction for regulating cellular.  And the network issues 
came up, and I engaged on that, and I had a little bit of a debate with an econ-
omist—I don’t know what happened to an economist named Peter Na-




AUDIENCE MEMBER: . . . who was writing some crazy pro-regulatory 
stuff, some crazy pro-regulatory stuff that California had to regulate cellular, 
because the feds couldn’t do it—and, uh, and he was completely wrong.  I 
came to a Brandeis-ian position, or a non-Brandeis-ian position on that, the, 
you know, you could actually—I mean because the economies of scale, and 
the network economies there were obviously pronounced, and it makes no 
sense to have that kind of a Byzantine system for, and, you know, fragmentary 
system for regulation.  So we have federal regulation of cellular.   
But we, we actually have a crisis in this country with this, and there’s this 
wonderful paper by Prescott and Ohanian, and the third author, a couple years 
ago, that looked at zoning regulations.  Okay, which are the classic 
NIMBYism, at the local level.  It specifically looked at, actually, state zoning 
and said that fully one-half of the missing income this, this crisis in income 
inequality that’s been seen in the stagnation of median incomes in the United 
States over the last 40 years—fully one-half of it could be explained by land 
use laws that keep people in low-wage jurisdictions from moving to high-
wage jurisdictions.   
Look at Silicon Valley in the United States.  See what we’ve done with 
land use at the local level.  Go to Shenzhen, China and see their Silicon Valley, 
and see what they’ve done with land use, and you’ll be shocked to know that 
a communist government has been vastly more efficient in allocating scarce 
resources in that particular context, and that’s the NIMBYism of localism.   
So, I’m very much sympathetic to the laboratories-of-democracy ra-
tionale and competition between jurisdictions, and of course there are many 
things—health, safety, and welfare—that can be better done, and should be 
left—and there should be a competitive, you know, competitive world be-
tween jurisdictions. 
And I think States can—they’re not, they’re not competing for the prod-
ucts they’re competing for the innovators, they’re competing for the, for the 
entrepreneurship to bring in, in Arizona and so forth, and I think that that’s 
[Vol. 47: 965, 2020] Panel Transcript 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
996 
certainly, that’s a very powerful argument many—but this, this is a trade-off 
where you do have to look at the particulars of a situation, and I think in a lot 
of cases for new technologies that, that some federal preemption will be bet-
ter—not perfect, there’s no Nirvana either side. 
But, as I say, if you know you want to, want to get horrors of federal 
mistakes, yes, you can do that.  And we should do—we should have alcohol 
to help us along in those discussions—they’re gonna go on for a long time, 
they’re gonna get better as you go, so you need to drink but, but there’s also 
problems with local jurisdictions.   
And, you know what, I mean anybody who’s honest knows that there has 
to be a restriction, a constitutional regime that limits the rent-seeking, and 
what you have—sometimes you say, well California is doing well and they 
have a lot of regulation.  They have the natural resource curse, if you, if you 
want to, if you want to get to it, a lot of oil-rich states do a lot of terrible things, 
and they grow and they prosper.  And people move there, by the way.   
So, by a lot of metrics, political scientists know there is a natural resource 
curse.  Lots of bad things happen when there’s too much at stake for the ruling 
regime and sometimes that can be a problem, you know, even in California, 
even in countries like this.   
So, you know, I think it’s a very nuanced question.  So, you know, so I 
mean it really is something that—by the way I did I did get a lot out of this 
panel, I think, and you have great arguments either way.  But, I just wanted 
to . . . 
 




AUDIENCE MEMBER: And what’s your answer? 
 
McNEAL: Of course.  So I would say that I think I agree with a lot of that 
because the—just for me, because I was fired up to fire up the firing up—I 
agree with a lot of that.   
There are interesting corner cases, for example, on cellular—that I think 
maybe Brooks might want to talk to—which is just like the location of the 
cellular towers themselves and the impact that might have visually on a com-
munity, and that is land use and zoning being used as a backdoor way of reg-
ulating the technology itself. 
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But let’s kind of have some reactions to this because I think this is an area 
where we have probably agreement with, with Tom, and then . . . 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I know I talked too long to begin with; I have 
on that point and cellular sightings—yes and of course there happened federal 
rulings on this, both from courts and the FCC, that was some kind of aesthetic 
concern—certain regulations are perfectly permissible. 
You know, Williamsburg, Virginia has the right to limit satellite dishes 
even though it’s anti-competitive in a, in a real sense, but other communities 
don’t because they don’t have the same aesthetic concerns.  That’s a federal 
rule.   
Now, what I wanted to mention too was, now we do have an extraction 
problem very similar to the cable problems at the franchising issues on 5G.  
And there was a trade journal article a few months ago where the city of Sac-
ramento was reported to have gotten a private company to come in and, very 
efficiently, start the process of this huge, you know, 5G densification they’re 
gonna have 10, 10X base stations—this is the huge payoff local cells—and so 
you’ve got all these new cells going in, so you’ve got lots of new antennas, 
and there’s a permitting process and now there’s a question of, what are the 
fees? 
Now a lot of cities maintain, we just want to get maximum value for the 
community.  And they mean by that highest dollar cost—in terms of what the 
fees are—to gain access to public rights-of-way. 
That is completely wrong.  That is, that is anti-consumer and hostile to 
the citizens.  That is a rent-seeking device to monopolize that market.  What 
you want to do is have costs equal to marginal cost so that the public disrup-
tion and the resources taken by the competitors are rationally allocated, but 
you want competition.   
And I was just gonna say, in Sacramento what they did is they got a pri-
vate firm to come in—it was private privatization they contracted with a pri-
vate firm, one-stop shopping the new firms, Verizon, whoever can come in 
and get permitted—and, and this firm charges the fees and splits the fees, 
70/30 or something, with the county.  And so they didn’t say who set the fee 
in the article, I emailed the author, I said, “Who sets the fee?”  He said, “I 
have to ask.”  He said, “Never came up.”  So obviously they have a private 
company setting the fee; it’s gonna be a monopoly price.  This idea that 
there’s, you know, this extraction taking place is visible.  That has to be 
stopped for efficiency, for consumer welfare, for innovation.   
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If you can do it with a federal rule, I think I’d probably be in favor of 
federal preemption if the cities can figure out a way to have some more pro-
consumer attitudes on that. 
 
McNEAL: So Brooks, maybe so this question, it’s largely wrapped up in 
rent-seeking and the permit power of cities.  It’s a little bit about a heckler’s 
veto, but let’s uh. 
 
RAINWATER: So, I mean, on the whole I think I would say democracy 
is messy.  And I think that, ultimately, there are, kind of, challenges at every 
level of government. 
Just as you can give the stories about what’s happened with cable fran-
chise fees, I could talk about high-speed broadband internet, and the fact that 
states like Tennessee have stopped Chattanooga from being able to expand its 
municipal broadband into neighboring jurisdictions.  Even though, on the 
whole, the neighboring jurisdictions were quite conservative and wanted to be 
able to tap into this arguably municipal resource that could help them.   
And so I think that, yes, there are challenges with cities on rent-seeking.  
But I think there’s also examples where—if we could all agree that we should 
just get rid of non-competes overall—the states that are doing that could be 
leading the way for creating so much more economic value.   
So, ultimately, let’s think about where this is happening best; there will 
be kind of challenges at every level of government.  But it doesn’t seem to me 
that cities are kind of the piece that’s creating the most friction. 
 
WATNEY: I think that that’s a good point.  The thing I kinda wanted to 
go back to a little bit is, hopefully the framework articulated can help us also 
know how—which layer of the technology to regulate at which level.  Right?   
So, using cars as an example, you know, the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration regulates everything related to, like, the safety of the 
actual automobile—because that’s both where the larger network effects are 
and where it’s most costly to differentiate across different jurisdictions. 
And if you were to take that to, like, you know, a drone example, I think 
you can have totally different time, place, and manner restrictions on an indi-
vidual level.  Cities are obviously going to know where would be the most 
disruptive places to have drones flying around at night, you know, D.C. has a 
rule saying you can’t, like, park your scooter, like, on the National Mall—that 
seems fine—but that’s gonna differ from city to city. 
[Vol. 47: 965, 2020] Panel Transcript 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
999 
But if you had cities trying to regulate, like, the actual manufacturing re-
quirements of what these scooters or these drones were looking like, that 
would start to disrupt the network effects and the costs of differentiation 
across jurisdictions.  And so, I’m hoping that it can, not only help us, you 
know, determine what technologies to preempt versus not, but also the types 
of regulation to preempt versus where to allow federalism. 
 
McNEAL: I think we have time for one last question or comment.  
There’s one up there.  Microphone is on its way. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.  It’s been my experience, I’m sure 
many of yours as well, that regulatory law always is very slow to catch up to 
technology. 
And I’m from the city of San Diego; I work downtown where about a year 
ago, a little more than a year ago, the Dhokla spikes magically appeared on 
the streets one day followed shortly by the number of thousands of Bird scoot-
ers.  They seemed to be everywhere, and the city of San Diego in the mayor’s 
office and the city attorney had zero regulations whatsoever.  They just let 
them show up one day. 
And now we’re a year down the road, and of course there’s been car ac-
cidents, personal injury matters, etc., and they’re now realizing they need to 
regulate these scooters, primarily scooters, in San Diego.   
So my question for the panel is this: how do we ensure that we kind of 
the law keeps up with technology and we have efficient regulations from the 
start of these great new technologies that we’re seeing in many different as-
pects of our society rather than just lagging behind? 
Because right now it’s turned into kind of a huge mess, and the debate the 
primary users of the scooters in downtown San Diego are Millennials that live 
downtown and, of course, they’re older people like myself and business own-
ers and property owners that hate the scooters and want them gone completely.  
So now there’s this huge tug-of-war and it’s getting very political as opposed 
to having a good efficient regulatory system in place when these technologies 
start. 
 
GOODWIN: Yes, so my response to that is everyone wants to give their 
power to the Ring of Power.  They want that magical expert to come up with 
an efficient governance scheme and even better that that scheme be in place 
prior to an emerging technology coming into existence. 
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That’s a great vision, but it’s a great vision that will result in those emerg-
ing technologies never coming into existence.  And so my admonition to you 
is not particularly comforting, but it’s a recommendation that you have to em-
brace the political.  
And I would much rather there have the political be a local political dis-
pute than what we have at the national level.  The last thing I want is a national 
scooter policy.  I mean God forbid; the homogeneity of modern America is 
bad enough as it is.  The last thing I want is some version of, you know, com-
munist capitalism that gives us all a pseudo-efficient, you know, bland Amer-
ica where . . . 
 




GOODWIN: . . . everywhere you go you have access to just the right 
amount of scooters is exactly the kind of dystopia that I fear; rather, I think 
that we should be encouraging communities to engage and take ownership of 
these issues.  And better yet the actual individuals subordinate to the political 
jurisdiction to come up with solutions and remedies, and then find local first 
attempts at solutions. 
Yes, there are many enormous costs.  I mean, I’ve led with the example 
of the obvious rent-seeking that folks engage in.  One of the best examples 
that I was ever involved in locally was a client, who had been recently shut 
out of a local trash market, sent me to a hearing about, you know, some com-
plaints that had been raised about a competitor.  And it was a landfill hearing 
on a Wednesday night, and if you’ve ever known that you’ve made like wrong 
choices in your life, it’s when you’re at an SCAQMD hearing on a Wednesday 
night at 9:00 PM thinking “where did I go wrong?” 
But it got worse because a bunch of—in this quasi, you know, judicial 
proceeding—a bunch of folks came up to testify that know they lived right 
next to the landfill and they couldn’t smell anything, and they never heard the 
competitor’s trucks.  They must be really quiet trash trucks.   
And every interview would end with, “and who do you work for?”; and 
they’d say “the trash company.”  And it was it was an example of exactly what 
you don’t want to have happen at the at the local level.  So I yield to no one 
in my fear and concern for the capacity of rent-seeking; however, that’s where 
the battle should happen, because I can wake up and, you know—I haven’t 
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gone to bed at 8:00 PM on a Wednesday—but I can go to that hearing, and I 
can influence the outcome. 
I can’t influence almost anything in Sacramento and certainly nothing in 
DC.  So, let’s beware of, you know, ceding our authority to the Ring of Power 
and embrace the political fights, which are messy and they’re unfortunate, but 
I think that’s what we need a lot more of. 
 
HAGEMANN: I would agree wholeheartedly with Bill.  I will caveat 
what I’m about to say by noting that I made a promise to myself not so long 
ago that I would never comment specifically on these scooters because I just 
don’t care to. 
So as a general matter on the issue of how it is you plug that discrepancy 
in the pacing problem that you identified, I agree with Bill wholeheartedly: 
what you really want to do is you want to focus on regulatory regimes that 
exist at as local level as humanly possible, because they afford greater respon-
siveness to local political machinery and the local population. 
And so the feedback mechanism is much shorter, so you can actually get 
more flexible rules that respond to demands at a much greater speed than you 
can say through, you know, any standard APA rulemaking process at the fed-
eral level, especially when considering the disparities in the amount of power 
and influence and resources that are required in order to lobby at the federal 
level versus the local level. 
I think it just makes natural sense that, if it was me, I would have a piece 
of federal legislation that would basically say for all new emerging technolo-
gies that have no existing federal agency apparatus to oversee their operation, 
automatic authority just evolves to the states who are then empowered to fur-
ther empower municipalities if it’s a Dillon rule state; if it’s a home rule state, 
then to the municipality go forth. 
 
RAINWATER: So, I think this may be something where we all agree be-
cause what you both are saying just makes a ton of sense.   
And I think also as we think about emerging technologies, the venture 
capital fueled model actually takes into consideration kind of the legal and 
political arbitrage that’s gonna happen in any given city because they are 
thinking that, you know, you’re gonna go into some cities where you might 
drop six hundred scooters, and the city just takes them all and impounds them 
or fines you every day because you’ve gone in and kind of broken the law.   
And so I do think that, you know, the law is catching up rather quickly 
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and I think that we probably need to have it catch up even quicker, but having 
this happen and kind of play out within the city context will ultimately get us 
to a better place. 
And I would also just mention, kind of a quick aside, that it was probably 
about five years ago when I was at a rather large tech firm that is an autono-
mous vehicle space and one of their key people made the comment that we’re 
gonna put these cars on the street, and then we’re gonna figure out the legal 









WATNEY: Yeah, so the other thing I would add just as I’m thinking.  I 
think there can also be, I think, fruitful ways for maybe the federal government 
to incentivize experimentation without necessarily dictating a model. 
Because you also run into the problem where oftentimes like local re-
gimes can get very stuck in their ways, they don’t want to change.  NIMBYism 
is a great example.  And if you’re concerned about the fact that we don’t know 
what one model is the best to impose over an entire country, you can incen-
tivize experimentation, right? 
So you’ve seen bills to kind of do that with bail reform.  You know, crim-
inal justice is an inherently very local level, but you’ve seen a couple bills to 
basically provide money and incentives to states to experiment with, you 
know, removing cash bail, or replacing it with something, or seeing if there’s 
a better way to target it to actually assess the risk that it’s happening.   
And I think you could imagine something similar happening for, you 
know, urban housing reform, for emerging technology legislative frame-
works.  And that also kind of gets back to the idea of how early are we in the 
technologies development; I think if you had like a general timeline of very 
emerging technologies or, you know, mature technology, probably on average 
emerging technology.  
Although Siegel’s gonna prefer federalized approach because we just 
don’t know, but then again as it gets more mature, and as you know the heck-
ler’s veto issues start increasing, then that may be a time to reconsider. 
[Vol. 47: 965, 2020] Panel Transcript 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1003 
 
McNEAL: I guess I’ll just offer you a little bit of hope on the way that 
this worked out.  You mentioned that businesses and others in the community 
have been concerned about the way scooters were deployed in the way that it 
occurred. 
If you imagine an alternative scenario where prior to anyone in the city of 
San Diego ever seeing a scooter, a scooter company went in and sat down 
with the government and got the regulation or the government started to deal 
with regulations prompted by the most interested party who cared the most 
about scooters the population who had never seen them and the company plan-
ning to deploy them—what would that regulation look like, right?   
As opposed to now where people have seen the negative externalities of 
the technology, and they actually have something to say about where the tech-
nology will be and what not.   
So you might actually now, with democratic participation—interested 
constituents, get a better more optimal outcome than you otherwise would 
have.  A few people along the way have been hurt and hopefully the tort sys-
tem is going to allow, you know, them to recover further injuries along the 
way. 
But you might get a better regulatory regime now, with the lessons 
learned, than you would have had we had an ex ante regime that was put in 
place by only the interested party who cared to show up at the hearing when 
nobody else knew the thing that was coming. 
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